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1. Introduction 
In an ideal world, banking operations should ensure that there is a match between business strategy 
and loan assessment behaviour (Berger and Udell, 2004). However, in reality, banks are confined 
within a highly institutionalised environment which shapes their lending behaviour. Banks operate 
between two spectra in terms of regulatory environment, with policies based either on financial 
repression or liberalisation. Repressive policies are more common in the banking sector than capital 
markets. According to McKinnon (1973), financial repression is defined by various policies whereby 
the state influences credit allocation in channelling financial resources to priority areas identified by 
the government and micromanaging banks’ lending behaviour through interest-rate caps, collateral 
requirements and capital controls. Financial liberalisation, on the other hand, is regarded as an 
efficient means of fostering competition and inviting growth impulses from abroad (Bartolini and 
Drazen, 1997). After a series of decisions supporting financial liberalisation which took place from 
the 1970s to the 1990s, this type of policy has been intensively studied by scholars. However, there is 
still no consensus on whether it has positive or negative impacts.  
The high degree of autonomy given to banks in terms of risk management prior to 2008 led to a 
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and had a domino effect on other developed economies. 
Therefore, not only in the United States but also among European countries, policy makers are 
designing regulations that could reduce the autonomy of banks in terms of risk management and 
decrease risk-taking behaviour. These governments have made policy interventions in their banking 
sectors which could be identified as repressive policies, for example, lowering nominal interest rates. 
Nevertheless, none of these governments has identified the interventions as being financially 
repressive. They are commonly justified as macro-prudential regulations. On the other hand, 
regulatory authorities in Myanmar are increasing banks’ independence in the area of providing loans 
to facilitate better financial resource allocations. However, we are yet to understand to what extent 
regulations need to be tightened or loosened up to reach optimal risk-taking behaviour. Moreover, we 
are not fully aware of whether macro level policy measures alone can control banks’ risk-taking 
behaviours in complicated loan assessment processes. Prior studies which have analysed the impact of 
financial liberalisation and repression on banks’ lending in both developed and developing countries 
have used aggregate level data such as changes in banking policies and credit volumes. However, 
micro level data on banks’ lending behaviours would provide a complete picture of how banks 
respond to changes in macro level policies (Hübler et al., 2008). This will allow policy makers to 
identify opportunities and risks to draw better targeted policy recommendations. 
Myanmar is one of the last countries with a repressive financial system. Its current fragile and 
inefficient financial system underwent reforms in 1963, 1990 and 2010 after its independence from 
the British government in 1948. Along with political reforms, economic reforms always took place in 
Myanmar. The first banking sector liberalisation actually began in 1990 when private banks were 
given licenses to increase competition within industry. After the 2003 financial crisis that only 
affected the country, further repressive measures were introduced to maintain safety and stability in 
the banking sector. Again, after the historic general election in 2010, further economic reform began 
and financial liberalisation was part of the process by default. Despite these reforms, the challenges in 
the banking industry remain the same. In other words, there is a need to examine the effectiveness of 
macro level financial policies on banks in Myanmar. This has led to the main research question for 
Page 1 of 15 Pacific Accounting Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Pacific Accounting Review
this paper: How do banks assess loan applications under a repressed financial regulatory environment 
which promotes risk aversion? 
2. Literature Review on Myanmar’s Banking System and Financial Repression  
Than (2014) argued that academic research on Myanmar’s economic and financial sector were mainly 
confined to dissertations and seminar papers that were rarely published. In recent years, due to 
political and economic reforms, a number of international organisations have paid exorbitant prices 
for macroeconomic overviews, assessments of market conditions and investment climate along with 
sectoral and subsector analyses. They have been presented at business events for investment but they 
are not available in the public domain. Organisations such as the World Bank, International Finance 
Corporations (IFC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Price Water House Coopers (PwC) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have partnered with local 
organisations to identify areas for improvement and policy points requiring attention in the banking 
and finance sector.  
One of the notable studies was conducted by IFC and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) (Duflos et al., 2013). Though it mainly focused on Myanmar’s microfinance sector, it 
observed that Myanmar’s overall financial infrastructure was underdeveloped and no functioning 
payment system was in place. Another report related to the financial sector was published by 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). This report stated that, despite the current 
reforms, the legal framework including the financial infrastructure of the banking industry lagged 
behind international standards (GIZ, 2015). Similar conclusions were made in one of the ADB’s 
reports, written by Vikram Nehru (Nehru, 2015). The common theme mentioned by these authors was 
the need for financial sector liberalisation for economic growth as Myanmar banks were too tightly 
controlled by the government and more autonomy was needed. Despite of the financial sector reforms 
already having taken place, the recommendations for the banking sector by these authors are still 
comparable to the conclusions of those who analysed Myanmar’s political economy before the reform 
in 2010 (Turnell, 2009; Turnell, 2011; Mieno, 2013). This raises questions about the level of 
effectiveness of these macro level policies on micro level institutions.  
Such recommendations were made because researchers believed that financial liberalisation would 
ultimately accelerate economic growth through the promotion of financial sector development, 
improvement of resource allocation efficiencies, positive technological progressions and financial 
stability (Huang and Wang, 2011). Hence, in many developing countries, a pre-liberalisation period is 
associated with financial repression and many researchers have attributed ultimate economic growth 
to financial liberalisation (Shaw, 1973; Levine, 2004). Based on these theoretical underpinnings, 
many countries embarked on reforms of their financial sectors during the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s 
(Amri and Kocher, 2012). There were 124 episodes of banking crises from 1970 to 2007. Hence, not 
all the countries that underwent liberalisation experienced positive impacts. Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) reported that the banking crisis that Chile experienced was due to financial sector deregulation. 
Similarly, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and Lee et al. (2002) attributed financial liberalisation to the debt 
crisis in Latin America and the 1997 Asian financial crisis respectively.  
On the other hand, Demetriades and Luintel (2001) found that financial repression actually had 
positive impacts on South Korea’s financial development. Likewise, Huang and Wang (2011) stated 
that, although China had one of the most repressed financial systems, it was still able to enjoy 
considerable economic growth. Unlike in other parts of the world, banks in Asia often receive more 
government interventions (Narayanamurti and Batten, 2015). In general, the role of banks as 
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commercial enterprises is limited. Banks are compelled to lean towards carrying out their 
governments’ economic policies and fulfilling certain strategic directions. Therefore, Asian financial 
systems are generally more prone to financial repression than their Western counterparts. Hence, 
before attempting to understand whether financial repression or liberalisation would facilitate 
economic growth, one needs to understand the behaviour of economic actors within the institutional 
environment and the implementations of macroeconomic policies by them at micro levels.  
At an institutional level, in various respects, the Myanmar government struggles with coordination 
between different parts of the government, or even between departments of the same ministry as a 
result of the size of the bureaucracy resulting from the legacies of military and socialist economic 
governance systems (Bissinger, 2014). These systems were put in place to control the economy and 
centralisation was a key aspect of government administrations. In addition, the government had no 
capacity to formulate and implement new policies. After political reform in 2010, the Myanmar 
government has been receiving technical and financial support from international organisations for 
both infrastructure and capacity building. However, the Myanmar banking sector is still facing similar 
challenges to those experienced before the current economic reforms. For example, banks are still not 
providing loans to businesses despite receiving grants from the government (Hammond, 2015; Htwe, 
2015).  
It was also reported that, due to the central bank’s repressive financial policies, which aim to promote 
financial stability by imposing barriers on lending by banks, the official in government banks would 
ask borrowers to pay them five percent of the loan to ensure that they had ease of access to financing 
(Kyaw, 2015).
1
 This evidence indicates that the formal constraints imposed on institutions are not 
always effective. The controls are not always compatible with the internal objectives of the economic 
actors. Therefore, such policies do not always deliver the desired outcome but rather, they may create 
new rules for the economic games being played by the actors involved. In other words, policy makers 
should move away from a one-dimensional view of policy making. They should make an effort to 
understand the interplay between institutions by recognising that cultures, traditions, society’s rules 
and norms also play a role in shaping policy outcomes.  
3. Research Method 
It has been accepted that there are limited scholarly works in Myanmar due to the opacity of the 
country’s governance system, and even secondary data are not reliable and accurate (Pick and Thein, 
2010). Than (2014) has claimed that there are significant gaps in the baseline data and that the 
unreliability of statistics is a fact of life. Win (2013) has discussed her challenges in conducting 
research into Myanmar’s banking sector due to the lack of reliable data. She observed errors in 
Myanmar’s inflation data reported to the World Bank between 1995 and 2011. This was based on her 
discussions with government employees about how the official data were calculated and reported 
without standard formulae or proper calculations.  
As the purpose of the study was to analyse the banks’ strategic formation in response to the demands 
imposed on them by regulatory institutions in a highly bureaucratised and repressed financial 
environment, the main method of data collection was interview. At the time of the study, which took 
place between 2010 and 2014, four domestic banks out of a total of twenty-one banks controlled 79 
percent of Myanmar’s lending market (as of 2011 data), suggesting an oligopolistic competitive 
situation. The data were collected from nine banks, representing 88 percent of the total assets of 
                                                            
1
 This information was collected from a local newspaper but it has been cross-checked with banks’ customers 
and local bankers.  
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Myanmar’s private banks. In addition, three government-owned banks were interviewed. Their asset 
values were unknown to the public. Interviews took place only at the banks’ main offices in Yangon 
which is Myanmar’s commercial city. Loan assessments and risk management occur only in these 
offices as loan officers from different branches across the country would present their assessments of 
loan applications to the credit committees at the main offices in Yangon for approval.  
An interpretative qualitative approach was adopted because it provided multiple realities and allowed 
the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of the situation (Myers, 1997; Son et al., 2006). This 
was a relevant approach for the study because the research event was emergent rather than prefigured 
(Creswell, 2013). The data collection involved a variety of methods including semi-structured 
interviews and documentation reviews. However, the main method of data collection was semi-
structured in-depth interviews. In the initial stages, interviews were conducted with businesses and the 
public as a fact-finding process about the background of the banks and Myanmar’s financial sector 
development. The second stage of interviews covered detailed issues relating to the processes, 
practices and discussion of the challenges that banks encountered in the context of loan provision to 
businesses under the stringent regulations. It allowed the researcher to uncover complex 
organisational-institutional interplay and how banks achieved profitability while maintaining a façade 
of convergence to institutional pressures. In other words, it enabled the research to uncover human 
action within the specific context of its occurrence (Patton, 2014). By presenting interview data from 
communication with only the senior management not only was a more accurate representation of 
strategic responses of banks to institutional pressures in loan assessments provided, but also the 
likelihood of biased results was mitigated as the participants were highly knowledgeable (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). The interview lengths ranged from two to three hours and a total of 23 hours of 
interviews were transcribed.  
Several steps were taken to improve the reliability of the data collection. First of all, an interview 
guide was used to ensure that there was a consistent framework and relevant themes were covered 
despite the focus of some interviewees on certain questions. Secondly, two researchers were present 
during each interview to enhance the reliability of the interview materials and conclusions drawn from 
them. Thirdly, all the participants were given an assurance of anonymity to encourage open and 
honest answers to the questions. After the transcription, NVIVO was used to assist in the qualitative 
data analysis process. This study uses pseudonyms for banks in Myanmar for the purpose of 
confidentiality. In this paper, for confidentiality, private banks are represented with the letter ‘P’, 
government banks with letter ‘G’ and semi-government banks with letter ‘S’.  
4. Findings 
This section provides the background of the study as the context is particularly relevant in case-
centred research where it becomes the basis on which various aspects of the case are analysed (Roller 
and Lavrakas, 2015). Afterwards, findings from the interviews will be presented. 
4.1. Myanmar’s Financial System 
Myanmar’s financial institutions have been operating under regulations which were passed in 1990, 
namely the Central Bank of Myanmar Law, Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law, and the Myanmar 
Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Law. Under these laws, there were 23 local banks, 
consisting of 4 state banks and 19 other banks, of which 4 received a license to operate in 2010. 
Although foreign banks were represented by local offices, they did not conduct any banking activity 
as of 2014. The non-bank financial institutions consisted of a state-owned insurance enterprise, a 
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state-owned small loan enterprise, a privately owned leasing company and one securities company. 
The Myanmar Securities Exchange Centre (MSEC) was launched in April 1996, a joint venture 
between the Ministry of Finance and Revenue and the Japanese Daiwa Institute of Research. 
However, there were only two listed companies, namely the Forest Products Joint Venture 
Corporation and the Myanmar Citizens Bank Ltd. Thus, there was no mature capital market for banks 
and other private sectors for financing businesses. As a result, the development of the banking sector 
had become particularly important for the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources and thus, 
for economic development. 
In 2003, despite banks being scrutinised at all levels, Myanmar’s financial system experienced a 
liquidity crisis due to the collapse of informal finance companies, which pay 3-4% per month on 
speculative investments such as real estate and construction. This was followed by another trigger for 
bank runs. Then, the Myanmar government enacted the Law to Control Money and Property Obtained 
by Illegal Means. This caused panic among depositors but the government was able to halt it. 
However, stability did not last long, with the rumour linked to the Asia Wealth Bank and their losses 
in foreign investments spreading among the public. Many of the borrowers had to sell off their 
business properties to pay off these debts. The crisis led to the closure of three leading private banks, 
Asia Wealth Bank, May Flower Bank and Myanmar Universal Bank. These banks engaged in 
providing speculative loans to industries with high risks. Though Yoma Bank’s license to operate as a 
financial institution was not revoked, the government limited its rights to provide financial services. 
The 2003 financial crisis in Myanmar occurred not because of weaknesses in regulation of the banks 
alone since the laws and rules were already stringent prior to the crisis. It occurred because of 
people’s lack of trust and the banks’ connectedness to political affiliates. Therefore, as banks 
developed and retained public trust depending on their forms of affiliation with politicians, they were 
also sensitive to any rumour related to their political affiliates.  
As of 2010, Myanmar did not have consumer protection agencies and neither did it have deposit 
insurance schemes for depositors until 2012. The banks in the country all operated under the Central 
Bank of Myanmar (CBM) which was, in turn, governed by the CBM law enacted in 1990. CBM also 
acted as a lender of last resort. Myanmar’s official banking regulations and guidelines for banks were 
relatively simple. After the 2003 financial crisis, Myanmar’s banking system became more repressive. 
As of 2014, banks were required to follow the guidelines below for lending. There are also other 
restrictions but I will only be presenting the guidelines that directly affected banks’ lending.  
Table 1: Repressive Lending Policies 
Guidelines Implementations 
Lending Limit to an individual 
borrower 
To limit risk exposure, the CBM limited banks so that loans to 
a single borrower accounted for not more than 30% of a 
bank’s total loan portfolio 
Interest rate ceilings The CBM controlled the minimum and maximum interest 
rates that could be lent and paid on deposits. For instance, 
banks could not pay less than 3% below the CBM rate on 
deposits and could not charge more than 6% above the CBM 
rate on loans. CBM also limited commitment charge of 1% on 
lines of credit 
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Loan to value ratios Banks could not lend more than 50% of the value of the 
collateral 
Loan Maturity Banks were only allowed to provide loans with one year 
maturity. However, they could be renewable depending on the 
borrowers’ circumstances. 
No overdraft and factoring 
facilities 
Banks were not allowed to provide overdrafts without 
collateral. 
 
5.2. Interview Themes 
Findings regarding the behaviour of banks in the context of different repressive policies were coded. 
The responses of interviewees were identified with pseudonyms along with their ownership structures. 
Similarly to other ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (Backman, 2001), 
concentration of firm ownership exists in Myanmar as well. This is because banks are set up either as 
family-owned businesses to fund their own investments or they share ownership with the government 
to carry out their specific strategic directions. Hence, it is worth mentioning the affiliations of the 
banks when analysing the data.  
Convergent Behaviour in the Context of Financial Repression 
Collateral Requirements 
 ‘Collateral requirements’ was one of the themes mentioned quite repeatedly by the interviewees. The 
representatives from the banks described how they are constrained with the collateral requirements 
imposed by the CBM. Hence, at the time of interview, they were not able to lend as much as they 
could before the 2003 financial crisis. The bank representatives mentioned that, although they 
believed that such collateral requirements restricted them from extending credit to reliable individuals, 
they needed to adhere to such requirements.  
Even if we know that the applicant is trustworthy and his serviceability is high, without collaterals, he 
would not get loans. This is not our policy. It is the Central Bank’s policy.  
P-B 
Collateral became more important after the 2003 financial crisis. The banks changed their internal 
policies on credit allocation policies for different sectors. The CBM made a law stating that banks 
must not provide unsecured lending. The only acceptable collateral is in the form of privately-owned 
land and buildings. In many instances, banks mentioned that they further restrict the types of land and 
building that they accept as collateral. There are different types of land such as freehold land, grant 
land, farmland, agricultural land, permit licensed land and vacant land. In Myanmar, land disputes are 
common. This applies to all types of land except freehold and grant land. The latter could also be 
problematic at times if those grants have been given by the military government. Its legacy of land 
grabbing of agricultural and vacant land for industrial developments is still causing land disputes 
between grant and licence holders of the land and farmers. Currently, Myanmar’s land laws provide 
little legal protection for every party involved in the process. As a result, banks have been taking as 
many precautionary measures as they can to assess the documents provided by a loan applicant. 
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Representatives mentioned that they would check the property deeds submitted by applicants with the 
Settlement and Land Records Department under the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.  
Moreover, one of the other complications has been the transfer of ownership when land and buildings 
are purchased. Due to the increasing real estate prices as a result of investors’ speculations in 
Myanmar, especially in the capital’s central business districts, purchasers often choose not to transfer 
ownership to avoid paying high stamp duty: 
Most of the time, borrowers come to us with deeds which are not under their names. We require them 
to change the name on the deed. I am sure you know about this. If they refuse to do so, they will need 
to bring guarantors.  
S-E 
We look at the type of buildings built in the collateralised real estate; the location and marketability 
affect the borrowers’ requested amount of loan. If the borrower has no collaterals, guarantors should 
be there with their deposits account or assets should be collateralised. These guarantors must be 
close relatives, preferably, parents. 
P-A 
It is common for land owners in Myanmar to have deeds which are not in their names. In many 
instances, there are two types of contract exchanges: one which is used to register with the Settlement 
and Land Records department and to pay stamp duty; and the other which is used to transfer the 
ownership of the estate at the real market value of the purchase. Purchasers normally record the 
purchase value as being lower than the actual market price to avoid paying high stamp duty as a result 
of increasing real estate values. Permit licensed land in Myanmar was given by the government to 
civil servants as part of its urban development programs. Similarly to other land purchases, transfer of 
ownership was not formally recorded so as to avoid paying stamp duty and other forms of legal fees 
associated with such purchases. However, unlike other types of land purchase, this permit licenced 
land has sometimes been exchanged between multiple owners over time with the name of the original 
recipient of the licence remaining unchanged. The process that banks have had to undertake in order 
to get assurance that the documents submitted by the loan applicants are genuine takes a significant 
amount of time. The conclusion is that, not only are the banks fulfilling the CBM’s regulatory 
requirements but they are also able to use these collateral checks as an instrument whereby the banks 
and borrowers build trust. 
These were not the only challenges that banks have faced in terms of collateral requirements. There 
are other legal issues which have prevented them from accepting other types of property such as 
apartments and condominiums as collateral. The key issue has been that the apartment owners do not 
always own the land located under their buildings. Hence, the owners are unable to use their 
properties as collateral and apply for mortgages. The paucity of condominium law has meant that 
bankers do not have the assurance that apartments are valuable and reliable collateral to fall back on 
in case of borrowers defaulting. Unlike land and buildings, the values of apartments and 
condominiums have been fluctuating greatly. Since 2011, the government allowed banks to accept 
gold and commodities as collateral. However, the pricing risks and perishability of the commodities 
have prevented banks from accepting them.  
Bank P-A also mentioned that they have concerns about not being able to pay money back to their 
depositors. This is particularly important in Myanmar as most of the loanable funds are based on 
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deposits unless they come from public limited companies. Nevertheless, since Myanmar’s stock 
exchange is under-developed, banks can only sell shares on their premises. Therefore, banks can face 
possible liquidity challenges regardless of whether they are public or private limited companies.  
Borrowers’ credibility and serviceability are determined mainly through the quality of collaterals. We 
can’t lose because these are our depositors’ hard earned money. We have the obligation to pay back 
our depositors.  
P-A 
The banks also mentioned that the main reason for using collateral to decide whether to approve a 
loan or not was because they could not rely on the financial statements provided by the loan 
applicants. Hence, though banks mention that the need to ask for collaterals from borrowers as one of 
the central bank requirements, there are some convergent values between banks and the regulators in 
terms of conservatism in lending practices.  
Interest Rates Caps, Loan Maturities, Loan Size and Government Influence on Credit 
Allocation 
The second theme that was mostly coded in the interviews is ‘Interest rates’. Unlike many other 
countries where a central bank sets base rates with the interest rates determined by banks, lending and 
deposit rates were regulated by CBM in Myanmar. As of 2010, CBM stated that banks could not 
charge an interest rate of more than 17%. Since 2011, CBM dropped the maximum interest rate to 
13% with a floor of 10%. Interests on deposits were provided at 8% per annum. Hence, since deposits 
are the main source of loanable funds for banks, they are expensive sources of funds.  
The shareholder-owned bank, P-A appeared not to lower the lending interest rate from 17% 
(maximum interest rate as required by the CBM as of 2011) though other banks, such as P-B and P-C 
set lower interest rates based on their preferences.  
The management sets lower interest rates for industrials and agricultural businesses and lend at the 
rate of 15% and give priority to export sector. 
P-B 
The standard interest rate is 17%; however, if the production sector meets industrial criteria, they 
would be charged at lower rate of 15%. We are not happy with how the interest rates are being 
capped. For the bank, it seems too low. If you think about the inflation, it is double digit. If possible, 
we would like to increase the interest rates.  
P-C 
According to the bank executives, banks must not charge higher or lower interest rates than the rates 
set by the central bank. Further interviews revealed that banks were more dissatisfied with the central 
bank’s interest rate limits than the collateral requirements. They believed that collateral requirements 
were important in risk mitigation, whereas interest rates were imposed upon them without 
considerations of the economic environment that banks had to operate in. The government has never 
been transparent in providing actual figures on inflation to the general public. On official data, 
Myanmar’s inflation data has always been stated to be a single digit. Banks believe that inflation is 
much higher than the official data provided by the government. Thus, they have claimed that they 
should be allowed to set interest rates based on their risk perceptions and the actual inflation rate.  
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The central bank also requires banks to provide loans at lower interest rates for industry as part of 
their development plans. Banks have stated that they do not have a choice in selecting the types of 
business that they would like to agree loans with. Private banks have mentioned that they do not get 
industrial loan requests from their borrowers because these types of loan are made by the government 
and semi-government banks. Therefore, through banks were to provide industrial loans at lower 
interest rates, they did not have such customer base. Another issue with such businesses is that they 
require long-term loans rather than short-term ones as their borrowing is used to finance capital assets. 
After the 2003 financial crisis in Myanmar, banks have not been allowed to provide long-term loans. 
All the loans provided by private banks have been short-term. Some interviewed banks believe that 
this amounts to sound banking practice. There is an industry-wide belief that banks should not furnish 
capital for customers to do businesses with and that their role should be to provide assistance only in 
certain seasons and for specific purposes. Loans are routinely renewed, meaning that banks can 
renegotiate and review terms of agreement if they have any doubts about borrowers. On the other 
hand, even if businesses can renew short-term loans, they cannot use them for fixed capital purposes.  
All of our loans are short-term. After one year, we reduce the collateral value by 10%, that is to 
reduce the risk, then, we renew the loans. 
S-A 
You see, our inflation is pretty high. Then, our government told us that inflation is single digit, then, 
they restricted our interest rates to 12% on deposit and 17% on lending. We cannot make profit at this 
point. I don’t care if they reduced the interest rates or not. We need the spreads to be much bigger. 
So, we cannot provide more than fifty percent of the collateral values. If they [borrowers] want more 
loans from us, give us more collaterals.  
P-D 
Prior to the 2003 financial crisis, banks have had two instruments with which off-set stringent 
regulatory restrictions: service charges and collateral values. Banks have been able to set their own 
service charges. This means that if the CBM limits upper and lower interest rates for lending, banks 
are able to vary their service charges depending on their perceived risk premiums. However, since the 
crisis, banks have not been allowed to charge more than 1% on service and commitment charges. 
Furthermore, loan sizes are limited to a maximum of fifty percent of the collateral values. 
Consequently, to externalise and mitigate default risks, real estate collateral is the only instrument 
available to them. When banks were asked about the types of flexibility they want from the central 
bank, they stated that they would like to be able to set the rates on lending and deposits.  
In theory, organisations in every country are managed rationally and centrally through national 
economic plans. Some banks are under pressure from social-political institutions which force them to 
lend to government-affiliated partners, sometimes without them fulfilling the set requirements: 
We sometimes are given orders from the government to give loans to certain borrowers, in such kind 
of circumstances; we need to be flexible with our requirements 
P-B 
Over the years, banks have been directed by the government to direct credit to certain industries. This 
enhances the banks’ roles in carrying out the government’s political and economic policies. 
Interviews with the banks demonstrated that the government economic policies are not always 
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compatible with the internal objectives of banks, i.e. profit maximisation. However, conforming to 
such regulatory pressures gives banks the advantage of being protected by the government in case of 
losses. In times of need, banks are required to provide financial assistance to different development 
projects as required by the government. For instance, after Nargis Cyclone, which destroyed the 
Ayarwaddy Delta region, the regulators asked the Myanmar Livestock and Fisheries Development 
Bank (MLFDB) to provide loans to salt factories at a 16% interest rate with government guarantees. 
The Co-operative Bank, Sibin Tharyaryay Bank and MLFDB also provided loans to Shwe Than Lwin 
Company for the government’s sustainability project in constructing Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
compatible cars. The compatibility of internal objectives and the government policies are determined 
by the formation of the banks in the first place. Many of the banks exist to supply loans to the 
government. Hence, interviewees at government and semi-government banks did not express any 
concerns about such pressures in the way that private banks did.  
Varying Levels of Institutional Pressure 
Despite the fact that all banks operate in the same economic and political environment, the levels and 
types of institutional pressure exerted differ from one bank to another. In private banks, collateral is 
considered to be the main requirement; however, the government-owned bank, G-A sometimes 
discarded this requirement: 
We do not have governmental guarantee scheme; however, sometimes, we ignore collateral 
requirements by giving unsecured loans. 
G-A 
Even with government-affiliated banks, sometimes collateral is not required and loans are provided 
for start-up businesses. Furthermore, the interviewees at the banks stated that executive business 
networks can reduce the cost of information processing and asymmetry of information. In government 
banks, these bank executives are civil servants with more authority for approving loans than those in 
private banks: 
When the board of directors brought the borrower to the bank, we give them the loans without 
collaterals because they are trusted by the directors. 
S-E 
Similar to the inconsistency of collateral requirements, in the context of loan maturities, government 
banks have more differing loan maturities compared to those at private and semi-government owned 
banks. For example, compared to private and semi-government banks, the G-A bank has much more 
flexibility in fixing the terms of a loan and is able to charge lower interest rates and give unsecured 
loans. 
We give short-term, medium-term and long-term loans. Short-term loans at 17% with maturity from 
one to three years, medium-term at 16.5% from three to four years and long-term loans at 16% with 
maturity over five years.  
G-A 
Such differences in regulatory requirements imposed on banks depending on their levels of 
governmental affiliation have led to different customer bases for banks. As the government banks 
have the privilege of providing loans with different maturity levels and interest rates, industrial loans 
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which are used for capital asset financing have generally been provided by the government banks 
rather than by the private banks. In other words, the government requires banks to provide industrial 
loans at lower interest rates than commercial loans and private banks are not able to fulfil the 
requirements due to the lack of such a customer base. In addition, private banks are more scrutinised 
by the CBM compared to government-affiliated banks: 
We have night meetings on Mondays and Fridays with the Central Bank. If the deposits are high, we 
have to give some justifications. Other government banks are not required to attend these meetings. 
P-A 
Since 2003, in addition to abiding by the above guidelines, Myanmar banks have been required to 
report their daily activities such as their liquidity, solvency and capital adequacy positions by banks’ 
senior executives by 6pm at the CBM. If they have higher deposits or loans than normal, they have to 
provide justifications to support this. This procedure is termed ‘Night School’ by these bankers. 
Government-owned and semi-government banks are exempt from such scrutiny. This demonstrates 
government favouritism towards government-affiliated banks. This can also be interpreted as private 
banks being perceived as taking more risks. Interviewees at private banks described the government 
dealings with the semi-government owned bank named Myawaddy Bank as an example of preferential 
treatment by the government. It is owned by the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Company 
and widely known locally as ‘U Paing’. The share capital of the bank is jointly owned by the 
Directory of Procurement of Burma’s Ministry of Defence and by various forces of cooperatives, 
regimental associations and veteran organisations. The bank is exempt from imposing service and 
commitment charges on loans. In addition, it is exempt from paying tax to the government. Hence, 
operational costs for the bank are much lower compared to other private banks as a result of the tax 
exemption and provision of loans to the bank’s counterparts in different sectors.  
In a similar way, some of the government-affiliated banks can lend amounts which are much higher 
than the CBM allows and no penalty is incurred by them.  
You see, for certain businessmen, our given loan amounts are much higher than their collaterals 
given to us. 
S-E 
Thus, the ownership structure is the most important determinant for the extent to to which repressive 
financial policies are exerted on the banks.  
Non-Conformity to Repressive Financial Policies 
The assumptions in institutional theory are challenged by rejecting the idea of bank conformity to 
institutional pressures. The idea is that banks under different circumstances and situations approach 
different strategies to achieve their desired outcomes or to avoid the need for conformity. Hence, in 
this paper, the resistance of banks to regulatory pressures, in order to accommodate their efficiencies 
or profitability rather than legitimacy through different strategic responses to institutional pressures, 
will be presented.  
In analysing the interview data for strategic responses, extreme forms of divergence can be only 
identified as ‘avoidance’. Since banks cannot avoid institutional pressures by exiting the environment 
in which rules and the expectations of the government are actively imposed, banks alter regulators’ 
demands in a manner which is, to some extent, acceptable. Hence, even though strategic responses 
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can be coded as ‘avoidance’, their tactics neither escape the institutional environment nor loosen their 
institutional attachments. In other words, banks try to conceal or disguise their non-conformities by 
taking advantage of Myanmar’s soaring property values. The regulatory restrictions on loanable funds 
are only 50% of collateral value. Nevertheless, one of the banks’ representatives, in interview, stated 
that, depending on the trustworthiness of the borrowers and profitability of the business, banks 
increase their loanable funds to up to 70% of the collateral value. This is effectively against the 
regulatory criteria. Such forms of non-conformities are disguised by the banks by inflating the market 
value of loan applicants’ collateral. 
[…] But we have this guideline that 20% of our total loans should not be for only one 
business/company. Normally, we lend 50% of the wholesale value of collaterals to businesses; if the 
prospect is good enough we increase to 60%. In the extreme cases, if the prospect is very good, we 
increase it to 70% to 80%. 
P-B 
We look at how the borrower paid the interest rate before; if he was prompt in paying interests, then, 
we renew for the next year, give loans up to 70% on the collateral values. 
P-A 
This was considered by banks to be a common practice in the industry especially among private and 
semi-government banks. These banks stated that government banks also engaged in similar activities. 
They mentioned that the government property value appraisers may receive bribes from loan 
applicants to overstate the value of their collateral to receive higher loans from the banks. 
Trustworthiness of the borrower can also be another motive for banks to compromise regulatory 
constraints such as high interest rate restrictions: 
If the business is good and the borrower is trustworthy, we reduce the base amount on which the 
interest rate is charged.  
S-D 
Representatives also believed that, even if the borrowers default, banks are well protected when 
liquidating such collateral at the market value. Furthermore, banks are able to disguise this on their 
financial reports submitted to the CBM. They believe that real estate collateral carries the fewest risks 
in Myanmar’s economic environment. In summary, private banks are more likely to diverge from 
institutional pressures when the prospect of the business and trustworthiness of the loan applicants are 
above their minimum acceptable levels.  
Compared to private banks, semi-government banks such as the Small and Medium Industrial 
Development Bank (SMIDB) has received funding from international donors and the government to 
lend to small businesses without collateral and at lower interest rates. However, in one of their annual 
general meetings, a director of the bank stated that: 
[…] we received government funding to lend to small businesses without collaterals and lower 
interest rates. We cannot lend all the amount of money that is provided to us. It is too risky. So, we put 
the money at other banks. We still get paid interest rates on our deposits. 
The conditions for receiving these funds required the bank to provide loans at 0.25% above the 
deposit rates and also without collateral. However, this did not match the bank’s appetite for risk and 
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their need to protect shareholders’ expectations of profit maximisation. Hence, they have 
compromised the regulatory requirements by balancing the expectations of both regulators and 
shareholders.  
All in all, banks may diverge from institutional pressures to meet the demands of organisational 
constituents to increase financial profitability and decrease the risks associated with their loan 
portfolios; the evidence suggests that banks do not implement strong forms of resistance to these 
pressures. They either choose to put on a façade of convergence or avoid any necessity to conform. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence on the controversial subject of financial repression and financial 
liberalisation through analysis of micro level data on bank lending practices rather than using 
aggregate macro level data. Bank level information offers an insight into the concerns of banks, the 
challenges facing them and their loan assessment processes while operating under repressive financial 
policies. This study is also unique in the sense that it is contributing to the limited academic literature 
on Myanmar’s financial system. It not only represents the last surviving case of a repressed financial 
system but also an extreme example of the presence of governmental interventions and prudential 
regulations. Hence, it has been used as an example to identify the efficacy of such policies. It has also 
uncovered interesting findings.  
First of all, the extent to which enforced repressive financial measures in banking differ, depending on 
the political affiliations and ownership structures of banks, has been highlighted. Such practices divert 
different types of loan applicants to private and government-affiliated banks. The latter would attract 
those with politically-affiliated businesses and connected lending becomes more prevalent. Hence, the 
results of macro level policies which focus on financial stability are not welfare–enhancing but rather 
sacrifice overall welfare for the gain of a handful of beneficiaries. Secondly, though repressive 
policies are enforced on banks to curb risk-taking behaviour among banks and maintain financial 
stability, the banks in Myanmar themselves inherently demonstrate aversion to risk in the context of 
lending. Similarly to James B. Forgan’s note on good banking practices in 1898 (see Lamoreaux, 
1996), the banks in Myanmar still maintain the belief that banks should not furnish businesses with 
loans for fixed capital but only for working capital purposes. Hence, banks are not always concerned 
about the central bank’s conservative lending criteria, especially in terms of collateral requirements. 
Banks’ risk aversion was further augmented by a lack of financial and legal infrastructure in place.  
Thirdly, in Myanmar, financial repression does not always mean banks need to compromise their 
efficiency in terms of profit maximisation to achieve legitimacy from the regulatory authorities. For 
example, though there were restrictions on the maximum loan to value ratios that banks can provide to 
borrowers, banks use the soaring property market to their advantage by inflating the market value of 
real estate used as collateral to provide large loans to businesses. Banks are able to disguise their non-
conformities on their balance sheets. In terms of the strategic responses of banks to institutional 
pressures, the evidence suggests that banks do not take strong measures to react to pressures and 
regulations from the government but are more likely to undertake weak forms of resistance such as 
disguise and avoidance. Banks do not consider such practices to be risky because of the soaring 
property market in Myanmar. Such practices over-expose banks to the property sector and put all the 
banks at risk if the real estate market were to collapse. Hence, the effectiveness of repressive financial 
policies put in place by the government to maintain financial stability becomes doubtful. In other 
words, different governmental policies create another different sets of rules in the lending game.  
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Furthermore, this paper presents an argument which prior studies have failed to recognise, i.e. the 
successes and failures of financial liberalisation policies and governmental reforms could depend on 
the acceptability and adoptability of the actors within the financial system. Hence, policy makers 
should move away from a one-dimensional view of policy developments and make an effort to 
understand the interplay between institutions. By recognising that there are sets of rules and norms 
established within the financial system over time, the desired policy outcomes are achievable.  
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